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1 Introduction
The on-going reform of the Basel Accord 1 relies on three “pillars”: capital adequacy
requirements, supervisory review and market discipline. Yet, the articulation between
these three instruments is far from being clear. On the one hand, the recourse to market
discipline is rightly justified by common sense arguments about the increasing complexity
of banking activities, and the impossibility for banking supervisors to monitor in detail
these activities. It is therefore legitimate to encourage monitoring of banks by profes-
sional investors and financial analysts as a complement to banking supervision. Similarly,
a notion of gradualism in regulatory intervention is introduced (in the spirit of the reform
of US banking regulation, following the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991).2 It is suggested
that commercial banks should, under “normal circumstances”, maintain economic capital
way above the regulatory minimum and that supervisors could intervene if this is not
the case. Yet, and somewhat contradictorily, while the proposed reform states very pre-
cisely the complex refinements of the risk-weights to be used in the computation of this
regulatory minimum, it remains silent on the other intervention thresholds.
It is true that the initial accord (Basel, 1988) has been severely criticized for being
too crude,3 and introducing a wedge between the market assessment of asset risks and
its regulatory counterpart.4 However, it seems contradictory to insist so much on the
need to “enable early supervisory intervention if capital does not provide a sufficient
buffer against risk” and to remain silent on the threshold and form of intervention, while
putting so much effort on the design of risk weights. Similarly, nothing very precise is said
(apart from the need for”increased transparency” !)about the way to implement Pillar 3
(market discipline) in practice.5
A possible explanation for this inbalance between Pillar 1 and the other two pillars
is that most of the formal analyses of banks capital regulation rely on static models,
1The Basel Accord, elaborated in July 1988 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
required internationally active banks from the G10 countries to hold a minimum total capital equal to
8% of risk-adjusted assets. It was later amended to cover market risks. It is currently being revised by
the BCBS, who has released for comment a proposal of amendment, commonly referred to as Basel II
(Basel Committee, 1999, 2001).
2The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 requires that each US bank be placed in one of five categories
based on its regulatory capital position and other criteria (CAMELS ratings). Undercapitalized banks are
subject to increasing regulatory intervention as their capital ratios deteriorate. This prompt corrective
action (PCA) doctrine is designed to limit supervisory forbearance. Jones and King (1995) provide
a critical assessment of PCA. They suggest that the risk weights used in the computation of capital
requirements are inadequate.
3Jones (2000) also criticizes the Basel Accord by showing how banks can use financial innovation to
increase their reported capital ratios without truly enhancing their soundness.
4See our discussion of the literature in Section 2.
5In particular, in spite of the existence of very precise proposals by US economists (Evanoff and Wall
(2000), Calomiris (1998), see also the discussion in Bliss (2001)) for mandatory subordinated debt, these
proposals are not discussed in the Basel 2 project.
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where capital requirements are used to curb banks’ incentives for excessive risk-taking
and where the choice of risk weights is fundamental. However, as suggested by Hellwig
(1998), a static framework fails to capture important intertemporal effects. For example,
in a static model, a capital requirement can only have an impact on banks’ behaviour if it
is binding. In practice however, capital requirements are binding for a very small minority
of banks and yet seem to influence the behavior of other banks. Moreover, as suggested
by Blum (1999), the impact of more stringent capital requirements may sometimes be
counter intuitive, once intertemporal effects are taken into account. The modeling cost
is obviously additional complexity, due in particular to transitory effects. In order to
minimize this complexity, we will assume here a stationary liability structure, and rule
out those transitory effects. Also for simplicity, we will only consider one type of assets,
allowing to derive a Markov model of banks’ behavior with only one state variable: the
cashflows generated by the bank’s assets (or, up to a monotonic transformation, the bank’s
capital ratio).
In this paper, we adopt the view, consistent with the approach of Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994) that capital requirements should be viewed as intervention thresholds for
banking supervisors (acting as representatives of depositors’ interest) rather than complex
schemes designed to curb banks’ asset allocation. This means that we will not discuss
the issue of how to compute risk weights (it has already received a lot of attention in
the recent literature), but focus instead on what to do when banks do not comply with
capital requirements, a topic that seems to have been largely neglected.
We build on a series of recent articles that have adapted continuous time models
used in the corporate finance literature to analyze the impact of the liability structure
of firms on their choices of investment and on their overall performance. We extend this
literature by incorporating features that we believe essential to capture the specificities
of commercial banks.
We model banks as “delegated monitors” a` la Diamond (1984) by considering that
banks have the unique ability to select and monitor investments with a positive net
present value and finance them in large part by deposits. Liquidation of banks is costly
because of the imperfect transferability of banks’ assets. Also, profitability of these in-
vestments requires costly monitoring by the bank. Absent the incentives for the banker to
monitor, the net present value of his investments becomes negative. We show that these
incentives are absent precisely when the bank is insufficiently capitalized. Thus incentive
compatibility conditions create the need for the regulator, acting on behalf of depositors,
to limit banks’ leverage and to impose closure well before the net present value of the
bank’s assets becomes negative. This is the justification for capital requirements in our
model.
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Notice that there are two reasons why the Modigliani Miller theorem is not valid in our
model: the value of the bank is indeed affected both by closure decisions and by moral
hazard on investment monitoring by bankers. Closure rules, i.e. capital requirements,
optimally trade-off between these two imperfections. However, these capital requirements
give rise to a commitment problem for supervisors: from a social welfare perspective, it
is almost always optimal to let a commercial bank continue to operate, even if this bank
is severely undercapitalized. Of course, this time inconsistency problem generates bad
incentives for the owners of the bank from an ex-ante point of view, unless the bank’
supervisors find a commitment device, preventing renegotiation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of the literature in
Section 2, we describe our model in Section 3. In Section 4 we provide the justification for
solvency regulations: a minimum capital requirement is needed to prevent insufficiently
capitalized banks from shirking . In Section 5 we introduce market discipline through
compulsory subordinated debt. We show that under certain circumstances it may reduce
the minimum capital requirement. Section 6 analyses supervisory action. We show that
direct market discipline is only effective when the threat of bank closures by supervisors is
credible. In this case, indirect market discipline can also be useful in allowing supervisors
to implement gradual interventions.
2 Related Literature
We will not discuss in detail the enormous literature on the Basel Accord and its relation
with the “credit crunch” (good discussions can be found in Thakor (1996), Jackson et al.
(1999), Santos (2000)). Let us briefly mention that most of the theoretical literature (e.g.,
Furlong and Keeley (1990), Kim and Santomero (1988), Koehn and Santomero (1980),
Rochet (1992), Thakor (1996)) has focused on the distortion of banks’ assets allocation
that could be generated by the wedge between market assessment of asset risks and its reg-
ulatory counterpart in Basel I. The empirical literature (e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991);
see also Thakor (1996), Jackson et al. (1999) and the references therein) has tried to relate
these theoretical arguments to the spectacular (yet apparently transitory) substitution of
commercial and industrial loans by investment in government securities in US banks in
the early 1990s, shortly after the implementation of the Basel Accord and FDICIA.6,7
Even if these authors seem to have established a positive correlation between bank cap-
ital and commercial lending, causality can only be examined in a dynamic framework.
Blum (1999) is one of the first theoretical papers to analyze the consequences of more
6Peek and Rosengren (1995) find that the increase in supervisory monitoring had also a significant
impact on bank lending decisions, even after controlling for bank capital ratios.
7Blum and Hellwig (1995) analyze the macroeconomic implications of bank capital regulation.
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stringent capital requirements in a dynamic framework. He shows that more stringent
capital requirements may paradoxically induce an increase in risk taking by the banks
who anticipate having difficulty meeting these capital requirements in the future.
Hancock et al. (1995) study the dynamic response to shocks in the capital of US banks
using a Vector Auto Regressive framework. They show that US banks seem to adjust their
capital ratios must faster than they adjust their loans portfolios. Furfine (2001) extends
this line of research by building a structural dynamic model of banks behavior, which is
calibrated on data from a panel of large US banks on the period 1990-97. He suggests
that the credit crunch cannot be explained by demand effects but rather by the raise
in capital requirements and/or the increase in regulatory monitoring. He also uses his
calibrated model to simulate the effects of Basel II and suggests that its implementation
would not provoke a second credit crunch, given that average risk weights on good quality
commercial loans will decrease if Basel II is implemented.
Our objective here is to design a tractable dynamic model of bank behavior where the
articulation between the three pillars of Basel II can be analyzed. Our model builds on
two strands of the literature:
• Corporate finance models a` la Leland and Toft (1996) and Ericsson (2000), who
analyze the impact of debt maturity on asset substitution and firm value;
• Banking models a` la Merton (1977), Fries et al. (1997), Bhattacharya et al. (2000),
Milne and Whalley (2001) who analyze the impact of solvency regulations and su-
pervision intensity on the behavior of commercial banks.
Let us briefly summarize the main findings of these articles.
Leland and Toft (1996) investigate the optimal capital structure which balances the
tax benefits coming with debt and bankruptcy costs . They extend Leland (1994) by con-
sidering a coupon bond with finite maturity T . They maintain the convenient assumption
of a stationary debt structure by assuming a constant renewal of this debt at rate m = 1
T
.
Leland and Toft (1996) are able to obtain closed form (but complex) formulas for the
value of debt and equity. In addition, using numerical simulations, they show that risk
shifting disappears when T → 0, in conformity with the intuition that short term debt
allows to discipline managers8.
Ericsson (2000) and Leland (1998) also touch on optimal capital structure, but are
mainly concerned with the asset substitution problem arising when the managers of a
firm can modify the volatility of its assets’ value. They show how the liability structure
8Building on Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Carletti (1999) studies the discipling role of demandable
deposits for commercial banks.
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influences the choice of assets’ volatility by the firm’s managers. Both consider a perpetual
debt but Ericsson (2000) introduces a constant renewal rate which serves as a disciplining
instrument.
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) characterise the consequences of the capital struc-
ture on an abandonment decision. They obtain an underinvestment (i.e. premature
abandonment) result. This comes from the fact that equityholders have to inject new
cash in the firm to keep it as an ongoing concern. Similarly, Mauer and Ott (1998) con-
sider the investment policy of a leveraged company and also exhibit an underinvestment
result for exactly the same reason. These papers thus offer a continuous time version of
the debt overhang problem first examined in Myers (1977): the injection of new cash by
equityholders creates a positive externality on debtholders’ claims and the continuation
(or expansion) decisions are under-optimal because equityholders do not internalize this
effect. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral (1999) elaborate on this aspect
by studying the impact of possible renegotiation between equityholders and debtholders.
They also allow for the possibility of strategic default.
In the other strand of the literature, Merton (1977, 1978) is the first to use a diffusion
model for studying the behavior of commercial banks. He computes the fair pricing of
deposit insurance in a context where supervisors can perform costly audits. Fries et al.
(1997) extend Merton’ s framework, by introducing a withdrawal risk on deposits. They
study the impact of the regulatory policy of bank closures on the fair pricing of deposit
insurance. The optimal closure rule has to trade-off between monitoring costs and costs
of bankruptcy. Under certain circumstances, the regulator may want to let the bank
continue even when equity-holders have decided to close it (underinvestment result).
Following Leland (1994), Bhattacharya et al. (2002) derive closure rules that can be
contingent on the level of risk chosen by the bank. Then they examine the complementar-
ity between two policy instruments of bank regulators : the level of capital requirements
and the intensity of supervision. In the same spirit, Dangl and Lehar (2001) mix random
audits as in Bhattacharya et al. (2002) with risk shifting possibilities as in Leland (1998)
so as to compare the efficiency of Basel Accords (1988) and VaR regulation. They show
that VaR regulation is better, since it reduces the frequency of audits needed to prevent
risk shifting by banks.
Calem and Rob (1996) design a dynamic (discrete time) model of portfolio choice,
and analyse the impact of capital based-premia when regulatory audits are perfect. They
show that regulation may be counterproductive: a tightening in capital requirement may
lead to an increase in the risk of the portfolios chosen by banks, and similarly, capital-
based premia may sometimes induce excessive risk taking by banks. However, this never
happens when capital requirements are stringent enough.
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Froot and Stein (1998) model the buffer role of bank capital in absorbing liquidity
risks. They determine the capital structure that maximizes the bank’s value when there
are no audits nor deposit insurance. Milne and Whalley (2001) develop a model where
banks can issue subsidized deposits without limit in order to finance their liquidity needs.
The social cost of these subsidies is limited by the threat of regulatory closure. Milne
and Whalley study the articulation between two regulatory instruments: the intensity of
costly auditing and the level of capital requirements. They also allow for the possibility
of banks recapitalization. They show that banks’optimal strategy is to hold an additional
amount of capital (above the regulatory minimum) used as a buffer against future solvency
shocks. This buffer reduces the impact of solvency requirements.
Finally, Page`s and Santos (2001) analyze optimal banking regulations and supervisory
policies according to whether or not banking authorities are also in charge of the deposit
insurance fund. If this is the case, Page`s and Santos show that supervisory authorities
should inflict higher penalties on the banks who do not comply with solvency regulations,
but should also reduce the frequency of regulatory audits.
We now move on to the description of our model.
3 The Model
Following Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976) and Leland (1994), we model the cash-
flows x generated by the bank’s assets by a diffusion process:
dx
x
= µGdt + σGdW. (1)
We also assume all agents are risk neutral with a discount rate r > µG.
Equation (1) is only satisfied if the bank monitors its assets. Monitoring has a fixed
(non monetary) cost per unit of time, equivalent to a continuous monetary outflow rb.9
b can thus be interpreted as the present value of the cost of monitoring the bank’s assets
forever. In the absence of monitoring, the cash-flows dynamics satisfies instead:10
dx
x
= µBdt + σBdW, (2)
9If monitoring cost has also a variable component, it can be substracted from µG. This monitoring cost
captures the efforts that bankers have to exert in order to extract adequate repayments from borrowers,
or alternatively the foregone private benefits that could have been obtained by related lending. Being
non monetary, this cost does not appear in accounting values but it does affect the (market) value of
equity for bankers.
10For simplicity, we assume that the bad technology choice is irreversible : once the bank has started
”shirking”, the dynamics of x is forever given by equation (2). Reversible choices would lead to similar
results, with slightly more complicated formulas. Reversibility would also complicate our analysis of
regulatory forbearance in Section 6.
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where B stands for the “bad” technology (and G for the “good” technology) and µB =
µG − ∆µ ≤ µG and σ2B = σ2G + ∆σ2 ≥ σ2G. For technical reasons, we also assume that
σ2G <
1
2
(µG + µB).
Notice that when ∆σ2 = 0, we have the classical first order stochastic dominance
(pure effort) problem. When ∆σ2 > 0, there is also a risk shifting component.
If the bank is closed, the bank’s assets are liquidated for a value λx (i.e. that is
proportional to the current value of cash flows 11). λ is given exogenously, and satisfies :
1
r − µB < λ <
1
r − µG . (3)
The first inequality means that closure is always preferable to the ”bad” technology :
Ex0
[∫ +∞
0
e−rtxtdt
∣∣∣ bad technology ] = x0
r − µB < λx0.
The second inequality captures the assumption that outsiders are only able to capture
some fraction λ(r − µG) < 1 of the future cash flows delivered by the bank’s assets.
However, due to the fixed monitoring cost rb, liquidation is optimal when x0 is small.
Indeed, the net present value of a bank who continuously monitors its assets is:
Ex0
[∫ +∞
0
e−rt(xt − rb)
∣∣∣ good technology ] = x0
r − µG − b,
so the “good” technology dominates closure whenever x0 is not too small:
12,13
x0
r − µG − b > λx0 ⇔ x0 >
b
νG − λ,
where
νG =
1
r − µG > λ,
while we denote by analogy:
νB =
1
r − µB < λ.
In the absence of a closure threshold (i.e. assuming that banks continue forever), the
surpluses generated by the good (G) and the bad (B) technologies would be as represented
in Figure 1 below.
11Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) assume instead a constant liquidation value.
12Genotte and Pyle (1991) were the first to analyze capital regulations in a framework where banks
have an explicit monitoring role and make positive NPV loans. In some sense, our paper can be viewed
as a dynamic version of Genotte and Pyle (1991).
13This implies that banks’ assets are not traded and thus markets are not complete. In a complete
markets framework, the moral hazard problem can be solved by risk-based deposit insurance premia and
capital regulation becomes redundant.
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Figure 1: Economic surpluses generated
by the good (G) and the bad (B) technologies.
The economic surplus generated by the good technology is therefore positive when x is
larger than the NPV threshold b
νG−λ , while the surplus generated by the bad technology
is always negative. We now introduce a closure decision, determined by a liquidation
threshold xL.
Assuming for the moment that the bank always monitors its assets (”good technol-
ogy”), the value of these assets VG(x) is thus determined by the liquidation threshold xL,
below which the bank is closed:
VG(x) = Ex
[∫ τL
0
e−rt(xt − rb)dt + e−rτLλxL
]
, (4)
where τL is a random variable (stopping time), defined as the first instant where xt (defined
by (1)) equals xL, given x0 = x.
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Using standard formulas,14 we obtain:
VG(x) = νGx− b + {b− (νG − λ)xL}
(
x
xL
)1−aG
, (5)
where
aG =
1
2
+
µG
σ2G
+
√(
µG
σ2G
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2G
> 1. (6)
The continuation value of the bank is thus equal to the net present value of perpetual
continuation (νGx− b) plus the option value associated to the irreversible closure deci-
sion at threshold xL. Interestingly this option value is proportional to x
1−aG , thus it is
maximum for a value of xL that does not depend on x, namely
xFB =
b
(νG − λ)
aG − 1
aG
. (7)
Proposition 1 : The first best closure threshold of the bank is the value of xL that
maximizes the option value associated to the irreversible closure decision. This value is
equal to xFB =
b
(νG − λ)
aG − 1
aG
. It is smaller than the NPV threshold
b
νG − λ .
The continuation value of the bank as a function of x (i.e. VG(x)− λx) is represented
below for different values of xL:
14See for instance Karlin and Taylor (1981).
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• xAL corresponds to excessive continuation (V ′G(xAL) < λ),
• xBL corresponds to premature closure (V ′G(xBL ) > λ),
• xFB corresponds to the optimal threshold (V ′G(xFB) = λ),
• b
(νG − λ) corresponds to the positive NPV threshold.
We now introduce the second characteristic feature of commercial banking, namely
deposit finance: a large fraction of the bank’s liabilities consists of insured deposits,15
with a volume normalized to one. For the moment, we assume that these deposits are the
only source of outside funds for the bank (we later introduce subordinated debt) and that
issuing equity is prohibitively costly.16 In the absence of public intervention,17 liquidation
of the bank occurs when the cash flows x received from its assets are insufficient to repay
the interest r on deposits. In this case, the liquidation threshold is thus:
xL = r. (8)
15For simplicity, we assume that these are long term deposits. It would be easy to introduce a constant
frequency of withdrawals, as in our treatment of subordinated debt in Section 5.
16Bhattacharya et al. (2002) make instead the assumption that the bank can costlessly issue new
equity. In that case, the closure threshold is chosen by stockholders so as to maximize equity value.
Milne and Whalley (2001) make the intermediate assumption that new equity issues entail an exogenous
fixed cost.
17Public intervention can consist either of liquidity assistance by the Central Bank, or on the contrary
closure by the banking supervision authorities. This is analyzed in the next sections.
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We also assume that when this liquidation takes place, the book value of the bank
equity (which, in our model, is equal to the book value of assets νGx minus the nominal
value of deposits) is still positive :
νGr > 1, (9)
but liquidation does not allow to repay all deposits :
λr < 1. (10)
Condition (9) captures the fact that, in the absence of liquidity assistance by the
central bank (introduced in Section 6) solvent banks may be illiquid.18 Condition (10)
ensures that deposits are risky.
The PV of deposits is computed easily:
DG(x) = 1− (1− λxL)
(
x
xL
)1−aG
, (11)
leading to the market value of equity:
EG(x) = VG(x)−DG(x),
or
EG(x) = νGx− b− 1 + (b + 1− νGxL)
(
x
xL
)1−aG
. (12)
Notice that since λxL < 1, deposits are risky. As a result, the PV of deposits D(x) is
less than their nominal value 1, the difference corresponding to the liability of the Deposit
Insurance Fund.19 If instead the bank ceases to monitor its assets, the value of equity
becomes, by a simple adaptation of the above formula (replacing νG by νB and b by zero):
EB(x) = νBx− 1 + (1− νBxL)
(
x
xL
)1−aB
. (13)
where
aB =
1
2
+
µB
σ2B
+
√(
µB
σ2B
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2B
. (14)
By comparing the value of equity in the two formulas, it is easy to see that in general
EB(x) > EG(x) for x in some interval ]xL, xS[, as suggested by the following figure:
18This assumption is in line with Bagehot’s doctrine for a Lender of Last Resort (see for example
Rochet and Vives (2002) for a recent account of this doctrine). In our model, it guarantees that optimal
capital requirements are positive. However it is not crucial: even if it is not satisfied, optimal capital
requirements are positive if b is large enough (see below).
19This liability is covered by an insurance premium 1 − D(x0) paid initially by the bank. We could
also introduce a flow premium, paid in continuous time, as in Fries et al. (1997).
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Figure 3: Comparing equity values
under good and bad technology choices.
4 The Justification of Solvency Requirements
Figure 3 illustrates the basic reason for imposing a capital requirement in our model:
as long as E ′G(xL) < E
′
B(xL), there is a region [xL, xS] where, in the absence of outside
intervention, the bank “shirks” (i.e. chooses the bad technology) which reduces social
welfare, and ultimately provokes failure, the cost being borne by the Deposit Insurance
Fund (DIF). As shown by Proposition 2 below, this happens when the monitoring cost b is
not too small. In order to avoid shirking, banking authorities (which could be the Central
Bank, a Financial Services Authority or the DIF itself) set a regulatory closure threshold
xR below which the bank is closed. In practice, this closure threshold can be implemented
by a minimal capital requirement. Indeed, the book value of equity is equal to the book
value of assets νGx, minus the nominal value of deposits, which we have normalized to 1.
The solvency ratio of the bank is thus:
ρ =
νGx− 1
νGx
.
This is an increasing function of x. A continuation rule x ≥ xR is thus equivalent to
a minimum capital ratio
ρ ≥ νGxR − 1
νGxR
def
= ρR.
Proposition 2 : When b is not too small, a solvency regulation is needed to prevent
insufficiently capitalized banks from shirking.The second best closure threshold (associated
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with the optimal capital ratio) is the smallest value xR of the liquidation threshold such
that shirking disappears. It is given by:
xR =
(aG − 1)b + aG − aB
aGνG − aBνB . (15)
Regulation is needed whenever xR > xL which is equivalent to
b > bˆ =
r[aGνG − aBνB]− (aG − aB)
aG − 1 (16)
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that, when regulation is needed (xR > xL = r), the implied solvency ratio ρR
is always positive:
ρR =
νGxR − 1
νGxR
> 0.
This is because we have assumed νGr > 1, which means that, in the absence of public
intervention, banks become illiquid before they become insolvent.20
Notice also that when b is very large, the liquidation value of the bank λxR becomes
greater than the nominal value of deposits (normalized to 1) and deposits become riskless.
In this case the incentives of banks’ stockholders are not distorted by the limited liability
option: they optimally decide to close the bank when x hits the first best threshold xFB
and the moral hazard constraint does not bind. We focus on the more interesting set of
parameters values for which undercapitalized banks have indeed incentives to shirk.
5 Market Discipline
There are several reasons why market discipline can be useful. First it can produce addi-
tional information that the regulator can exploit (this is usually referred to as “indirect”
market discipline). Consider for example a set up a` la Merton (1978) or Bhattacharya et
al. (2002) where xt is only observed through costly and imperfect auditing. As a result,
there is a positive probability that the bank may continue to operate in the region [xL, xR]
(because undetected by banking supervisors). If shirking is to be deterred, a more strin-
gent capital requirement (i.e. a higher xR) has to be imposed, to account for imperfect
auditing (see Bhattacharya et al. (2002) for details). In such a context, imposing the
bank to issue a security (say subordinated debt) whose pay-off is conditional on xt, and
20Even without this assumption, ρR is positive whenever b is large enough. This is in line with most
corporate finance models with moral hazard (for example, Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997)): when the cost
of effort (or the level of private benefits) is large enough, capital is needed to prevent moral hazard.
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that is traded on financial markets, would indirectly reveal the value of xt and dispense
the regulator from costly auditing21. This idea is explored further in Section 6.
When xt is publicly observed, as in our model, the supervisors can have recourse to a
second form of market discipline (sometimes called “direct” market discipline) which works
by modifying the liability structure of banks. This is the idea behind the ”subordinated
debt proposal” (Calomiris, 1998, Evanoff and Wall, 2000), which our model allows to
analyze formally.
Following this proposal, we assume that banks are required to issue a certain volume
s of subordinated debt, renewed with a certain frequency m. Both s and m are policy
variables of the regulator. To facilitate comparison with the previous section, we keep
constant the total volume of outside finance.22 Thus the volume of insured deposits
becomes d = 1 − s. To simplify the analysis, and obtain simpler formulas than Leland
and Toft (1996), we assume (as in Ericsson, 2000) that subordinated debt has an infinite
maturity, but is renewed according to a Poisson process of intensity m. The average time
to maturity of subordinated debt is thus:∫ +∞
0
mte−mtdt =
1
m
.
In this section, we consider that the regulator can commit to a closure threshold xR.
We focus on the case where λxR < d, so that deposits are risky, while sub-debt holders
(and stockholders) are expropriated in case of closure. We use the same notation as before
(for any technology choice k = B,G):
Vk = value of the bank’s assets,
Dk = PV of insured deposits,
Ek = value of equity,
while Sk denotes the market value of subordinated debt.
Starting with the case where the bank monitors its assets (k = G), the values of VG
and DG are given by simple adaptations of our previous formulas:
VG(x) = νGx− b + [b− (νG − λ)xR]
(
x
xR
)1−aG
,
DG(x) = d− (d− λxR)
(
x
xR
)1−aG
.
21Of course, if the bank’s equity is already traded, then this advantage disappears and the question
becomes more technical: which security prices reveal more information about banks’ asset value?
22It would be more natural to endogenize the level of outside finance but this would introduce a second
state variable and prevent closed form solutions. We are currently working on an extension of this paper
in this direction.
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SG is more difficult to determine. It is the solution of the following Partial Differen-
tial Equation, which takes into account the fact that, with instantaneous probability m,
subordinated debt is repaid at face value s but has to be refinanced at price SG(x):{
rSG(x) = sr + m(s− SG(x)) + µGxS ′G(x) + 12σ2Gx2S ′′G(x)
SG(xR) = 0,
leading to:
SG(x) = s
[
1−
(
x
xR
)1−aG(m)]
, (17)
where
aG(m) =
1
2
+
µG
σ2G
+
√(
µG
σ2G
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r + m
σ2G
. (18)
We immediately notice a first effect of direct market discipline: the exponent 1−aG(m)
decreases when m increases. Thus the value of SG increases in m. The value of equity
becomes:
EG(x) = VG(x)−DG(x)− SG(x)
= νGx− 1− b + [d + b− νGxR]
(
x
xR
)1−aG
+ s
(
x
xR
)1−aG(m)
. (19)
When m = 0, we obtain the same formula as in the previous section (no market
discipline): this is due to our convention to keep constant the total volume of outside
finance (s + d = 1).
A simple adaptation of formula (19) gives EB, the value of equity when the bank
shirks:
EB(x) = νBx− 1 + [d− νBxR]
(
x
xR
)1−aB
+ s
(
x
xR
)1−aB(m)
, (20)
where
aB(m) =
1
2
+
µB
σ2B
+
√(
µB
σ2B
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r + m
σ2B
. (21)
Thus a necessary condition for shirking to be eliminated is: ∆ ≥ 0, where
∆ = xR[E
′
G(xR)− E ′B(xR)].
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A simple computation gives:
xRE
′
G(xR) = aGνGxR − (aG − 1) (d + b)− s[aG(m)− 1],
xRE
′
B(xR) = aBνBxR − (aB − 1)d− s[aB(m)− 1].
Thus
∆ = [aGνG − aBνB]xR − [(aG − aB)d + (aG − 1)b + s{aG(m)− aB(m)}] . (22)
Now, let define xR(m) the minimum value xR that satisfies inequality ∆(xR) ≥ 0. Remark
that xR(m) is implicitly defined by the equation ∆(xR(m)) = 0. We show in Appendix C
that (EG − EB)(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ xR(m). We deduce
Proposition 3 : With compulsory subordinated debt, the minimum solvency ratio that
prevents bank shirking becomes
xR(m) =
(aG − 1)b + (aG − aB)d + (aG(m)− aB(m))s
aGνG − aBνB .
or equivalently :
xR(m) = xR(0) + s
(aG(m)− aB(m))− (aG − aB)
aGνG − aBνB . (23)
• When ∆σ2 > 0 this is a U-shaped function of m, with a minimum in m∗.
• When ∆σ2 = 0 (pure effort problem) m∗ = +∞, which means that xR(m) is de-
creasing for all m.
• Market discipline reduces the need for regulatory bank closures when m and ∆σ2 are
small.
In order to understand the intuition behind this result, let us recall that xR(m) is
defined implicitly by the tangency point between the values of equity under the good and
the bad technology:
∂(EG − EB)
∂x
(xR(m),m) = 0.
Given that the value of the bank’s assets and the value of deposits are fixed (once xR
has been fixed), the changes in the value of equity come from changes in the value of
subordinated debt. The question is therefore under what conditions does an increase in
the frequency of renewal of subordinated debt increase the derivative of SG less than the
derivative of SB (so that shirking becomes more costly for bankers). Proposition 3 shows
that this is true essentially when ∆σ2 and m are small.
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Figure 4: The impact of an increase in m on the gains
of equityholders when adopting the good technology.23
Figure 4 illustrates a case where the gap between EG and EB has been widened by
an increase in m (see dash line), giving the shareholders more incentives to choose the
“good” technology. This last property is expressed by the following condition:
∂2(EG − EB)
∂x∂m
(xR(m),m) > 0.
Proposition 3 clarifies the conditions under which market discipline is a useful com-
plement to solvency regulations: ∆σ2 and m have to be small. Indeed, when ∆σ2 is large,
m∗ is negative and xR(m) > xR(0) for all relevant values of m (i.e. positive). In this
case the introduction of subordinated debt is counterproductive, since it forces the regu-
lator to increase the minimum capital requirement. The intuition is that the incentives
for gambling for resurrection are, in this case, increased by the presence of subordinated
debt. On the contrary when ∆σ2 is small, m∗ is positive and for m smaller than m∗, the
opposite inequality is true: xR(m) < xR(0). Thus when the risk shifting problem is not
too big (∆σ2 small), then for m small, market discipline reduces the level of regulatory
capital.24 We now study how the efficiency of market discipline is affected by the attitude
of supervisory authorities.
23The continuous line represents the difference between EG and EB as functions of x. The dash line
represents the same function after m has been increased and xR modified accordingly
24More precisely, the regulatory requirement on equity (Tier 1) is reduced. However, it is easy to see
that the total requirement (Tier 1 + Tier 2), which includes subordinated debt, is increased.
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6 Supervisory action
The “second pillar” of Basel 2 is supervisory review.25 The Basel Committee states sev-
eral principles for a sound supervisory review, including: “Supervisors should review and
evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments... [and] take appropriate supervi-
sory action if they are not satisfied with the results of this process” (Basel Committee
2001, p31). However, this is more quickly said than done. Indeed, banking authorities
are very often subject to political pressure for supporting banks in distress. In our model,
this means providing public funds to the banks who hit the threshold xR. Given our irre-
versibility assumption, it is indeed always suboptimal (even ex-post) to let banks go below
this threshold. On the other hand, closure can be (ex-post) dominated by continuation,
when net fiscal costs are not too high. Therefore, whenever a bank hits the boundary
x = xR, the government considers the possibility of recapitalizing the bank up to xR+∆x
with public funds.
We denote by γ > 0 the net welfare cost of these public funds, due to the distortions
created by the imperfections of the fiscal system. Whenever the government intervenes,
the level of recapitalization ∆x and the new assets value 26 of the bank27 Vk,BO (for a
technology k ∈ {G,B}) are determined by
Vk,BO(xR) = max
∆x≥0
{Vk,BO(xR + ∆x)− γ∆x} . (24)
The function Vk,BO is determined together with (24), by the usual differential equation that
expresses absence of arbitrage opportunities and the “no-bubble” condition: Vk,BO(x) ∼
νkx for x→ +∞. Therefore Vk,BO(x) is necessarily of the type
Vk,BO(x) = νkx− bk + θkx1−ak
where the constant θk is determined by (24) and bk = 0 when k = B and b when k = G. In
Appendix B, we show that the optimal ∆x is actually 0+. This means that the government
injects the minimum amount needed to stay above the critical shirking level xR. This can
be interpreted as liquidity assistance.
Technically, xR becomes a reflecting barrier (see for example Dixit, 1993) and the
boundary condition for Vk,BO becomes:
V ′k,BO(xR) = γ.
25“The Committee views supervisory review as a critical complement to minimum capital requirements
and market discipline” (Basel Committee 2001, p30)
26This new assets value reflects that future government intervention is anticipated, every time the bank
hits again the threshold x = xR.
27The letters BO refer to the bail-out operation.
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The new formula for VG is:
VG,BO(x) = νGx− b−
(
γ − νG
aG − 1
)
x1−aGxaGR .
Notice that this liquidity assistance implies that VG,BO(xR) is now different from zero,
28
given that banks are allowed to continue after they hit xR. Interestingly, the impact on
the value of bank equity, and thus on the incentives for shirking essentially depends on the
behavior of the government towards sub-debt holders when the bank hits x = xR. Let us
examine successively the case of full expropriation and the case of complete forbearance.
If subdebt holders (and of course equity holders) are wiped out, the decision to rescue
the bank only affects the deposit insurance fund, who becomes residual claimant of the
assets value of the bank. On the other hand, the differential equation and boundary
conditions that characterize the value of subdebt are the same as before and thus Sk is
unchanged. Therefore the differential equations that characterize Ek (k = G,B) are also
unchanged and so are the functions Ek themselves. Market discipline is thus compatible
with public liquidity assistance, provided that subordinated debt holders lose their stake
if the bank is rescued.
The situation is different in case of complete forbearance, i.e. if subdebt-holders are
fully insured when the bank hits the critical threshold xR: Sk(xR) = s. In this case it is
easy to see that subdebt becomes riskless and thus its value is identically equal to s. But
then the subdebt term vanishes from the differential equation that characterizes Ek. This
means that market discipline becomes totally ineffective.
These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 : Public liquidity assistance to the banks who hit the critical threshold
xR is compatible with market discipline, provided there is no regulatory forbearance, i.e.
if subordinated debt holders are fully expropriated when the bank is rescued. If on the
contrary subdebt holders are fully insured, market discipline becomes totally ineffective.
Proposition 4 thus shows that direct market discipline is effective when the credibility
of supervisors to close insufficiently capitalized banks is established. We now go further
and show how indirectmarket discipline (i.e. information revealed by the market prices of
the securities issued by the banks) can be used to implement a more elaborated regulatory
policy, but again when regulatory forbearance is excluded. This illustrates that market
discipline is indeed a useful complement to the two other pillars of Basel II : supervision
and capital requirements.
28When γ > V ′G(xR), the cost of public funds is so high that the government prefers to close the bank.
Whenever γ < V ′G(xR), VG,BO(xR) > 0, which guarantees that bailout is socially preferable (ex-post) to
closure.
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As already discussed in Section 5, a branch of the academic literature has studied the
optimal mix between capital requirements and regulatory audits. In this literature, the
value of the bank’s assets (or cash flows x as in our model) is privately known to the
banker. It can only be observed by the regulator if a costly audit is performed, which is
modeled by a Poisson process, the intensity of which is chosen by the regulator. Since the
regulator wants to avoid excessive continuation, he has to set a higher closure threshold
than if x was publicly observable.29 However this threshold can be reduced by an increase
in the intensity of auditing, thus suggesting substitutability between supervision and
capital requirements.
Our model allows to extend this literature by integrating the 3rd pillar of Basel II,
namely market discipline, in this picture. Suppose indeed that the bank has issued at
least one security (equity, certificate of deposits or subordinated debt) that is publicly
traded on a secondary market. In our model, the price of such a security is a one to one
function of the state variable x. By inverting this function, the regulator can infer the
value of the bank’s cash flows to condition its intervention policy.30 In such a context,
the role of bank supervisors has to be re-examined: instead of a constant intensity of
audit across all banks, bank supervisors can adopt a gradual intervention policy (in the
spirit of the US regulatory reform following the FDIC Improvement Act). For example,
the regulator can set two thresholds xR and xI (with xR < xI), where xR is as before a
closure threshold, but xI is only an inspection threshold: whenever x < xI , the bank is
inspected,31 the technology chosen by the bank is revealed, and it is closed if and only if
the bank has chosen the bad technology (k = B).
With this regulatory policy, the value of equity when the technology is “good” is the
same as in Section 3 (with xR replacing xL):
EG(x) = νGx− b− 1 + kGx1−aG ,
with
kG = [b + 1− νGxR]xaG−1R .
29Here also, the regulator faces a credibility problem.
30An important empirical literature discusses the predictive power of subordinated debt prices or
spreads on banks’ probabilities of failure: see for example Evanoff and Wall (2001), Hancock and Kwast
(2001) and Sironi (2001). Covitz et al. (2002) argue that endogeneity of liquidity premia can significantly
decrease this predictive power. They argue the subdebt proposal mandating a regular issuance of subdebt
can reduce this endogeneity, thus improving information content of spreads and ultimately increase market
discipline. Evanoff and Wall (2003) show how subdebt spreads can be used as a complement to capital
requirements as a way to reduce regulatory forbearance.
31We assume that the regulatory audit policy is deterministic. It would be easy to consider the more
general case of stochastic audits.
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However the value of equity when the bank shirks is now a function of xI :
EB(x) = νBx− 1 + kBx1−aB for x ≥ xI , 0 otherwise,
with
kB = [1− νBxI ]xaB−1I .
For a given value of xI (and thus for a given function EB) there is a minimum value
of xR such that EG remains above EB. It is obtained when the two curves are tangent,
as suggested by the figure below.
Figure 5: Optimal capital requirement32xR
for a given inspection threshold xI .
Figure 5 illustrates well how the 3 pillars of Basel II can be optimally mixed: indirect
market discipline (i.e. information given to supervisors by market prices of securities
issued by banks) could allow a very “light” supervisory policy: only banks with x ∈]xR, xI [
are audited, and the capital requirement is reduced to xR (which is less than the one
obtained in Proposition 2, in the absence of audit).
7 Concluding Remarks
Our objective in this article is to design a simple dynamic model of commercial bank
behavior, where the articulation between the three pillars of Basel II can be analyzed. We
32It can be proven that this minimum level of xR decreases with xI , which establishes that the sub-
stitutability between capital requirements and supervision is maintained when market discipline is intro-
duced.
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interpret the first pillar (capital adequacy requirement) as a closure threshold rather than
an indirect mean of influencing banks’ asset allocation. We show that market discipline
(the third pillar) can be used to reduce this closure threshold, especially if there is a risk
of regulatory forbearance. We also re-examine the traditional view on the supervisory
role (second pillar).
We suggest that supervisors can modulate the intensity of their interventions (from
a simple audit to the closure of the bank) according to reliable signals given by market
prices of the securities issued by banks (indirect market discipline). However, two caveats
are in order: direct market discipline can only be effective if banking supervisors are
protected from political interference, and indirect market discipline cannot be used under
all circumstances, since market prices become erratic during crises periods. This shows
that Basel II proposals seem to be dangerously insufficient: important reforms of the
supervisory system have to be implemented as well, in order to guarantee independence
of banking supervisors from political powers and simultaneously proper behavior during
future crises.
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Appendix A : proof of Proposition 2
Since by construction EG(xR) = EB(xR) = 0, a necessary condition for elimination of
shirking is E ′G(xR) ≥ E ′B(xR). The minimum value of xR that satisfies this inequality is
defined implicitly by ∆(xR) = 0 where
∆(xR) = xR[E
′
G(xR)− E ′B(xR)].
But formulas (12) and (13) (with xR replacing xL) imply
xRE
′
G(xR) = νGxR + (aG − 1) [νGxR − 1− b] ,
xRE
′
B(xR) = νBxR + (aB − 1) [νBxR − 1] .
Therefore
∆ = [aGνG − aBνB] xR − [(aG − 1)b + aG − aB] ,
which establishes formula (15). Conversely, we have to prove that (EG − EB)(x) ≥ 0
for x ≥ xR when xR is given by formula (15). The proof is a particular case of the one
developed in Appendix C with m = 0, d = 1 and s = 0. Thus we have established that
regulation is needed when xR > xL, which is equivalent to condition (16).
Appendix B : Optimal recapitalization by public funds
is infinitesimal (liquidity assistance)
Consider a bank that hits the regulatory threshold xR. When government injects funds
∆x, the new continuation value of the bank at xR becomes :
Vk,BO(xR) = max
∆x≥0
{Vk,BO(xR + ∆x)− γ∆x} . (25)
Recall the expression of Vk,BO :
Vk,BO(x) = νkx− bk + θkx1−ak . (26)
We want to establish that a finite ∆x > 0 is never optimal.Let us assume by contradiction
that such a ∆x is optimal. The First Order Condition leads to :
V ′k,BO(xR + ∆x) = γ.
Now, because of equation (25),
Vk,BO(xR + ∆x) = −γ∆x + Vk,BO(xR)
= Vk,BO(xR)− V ′k,BO(xR + ∆x)∆x
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Given that for θk = 0, Vk,BO is either convex or concave, the above equality is only possible
when θk = 0, Vk,BO is affine and the optimal ∆x is either 0 or infinity .Since by assumption
γ > νG, the optimal ∆x is always zero.
Appendix C : proof of Proposition 3
We have to prove that
(EG − EB)(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ xR(m).
This result is a straightforward consequence of the lemma:
Lemma 1
E ′G(x) > E
′
B(x) for all x > xR(m). (27)
Proof of Lemma 1:
For all x > xR(m) :
xE ′G(x)− xE ′B(x) = (νG − νB)x
+(1− aG){d + b− νGxR(m)}
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG
−(1− aB)(d− νBxR(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aB
+s(1− aG(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG(m)
− s(1− aB(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aB(m)
Introducing in this equality, the inequalities x > xR(m), 1 − aG < 1 − aB < 0, and
(d + b− νGxR(m)) > 0, we obtain :
xE ′G(x)− xE ′B(x) > ((νG − νB)xR(m) + (1− aG){d + b− νGxR(m)}
−(1− aB){d− νBxR(m)})
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG
+s(1− aG(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG(m)
− s(1− aB(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aB(m)
= (aG(m)− aB(m))s
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG
+s(1− aG(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG(m)
− s(1− aB(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aB(m)
.
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Since aB(m) < aG(m), this is greater than
(aG(m)− aB(m))s
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG
+s(1− aG(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG(m)
− s(1− aB(m))
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG(m)
= (aG(m)− aB(m)) s
((
x
xR(m)
)1−aG
−
(
x
xR(m)
)1−aG(m))
> 0 since 1− aG(m) < 1− aG < 0 and x > xR(m).
Thus our result.
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